Avalanche Story

September 5, 1996
To:              The Mountaineers Board of Trustees
From:          Jerry Scott, DB, KC

Subject:       Red Mountain Accident Investigation _____________________________________________________________
The following is the report from the committee formed to investigate the events on May 19, 1996 when an avalanche hit a party of eleven Mountaineers on an Alpine Scrambles trip to Red Mountain near Snoqualmie Pass.  Our report is based on the written accounts supplied by party members, conversations with party members, our visit to the site of the avalanche and our personal experience.

Background information

The May 19 trip was a regularly scheduled Alpine Scramble led by DT, an experienced scramble leader.  Red Mountain is a common objective for Mountaineer scrambles.  (In fact there are two Red Mountains which are often scrambled by the Mountaineers – one near Snoqualmie Pass and one in the Teanaway.  This accident happened on the "Snoqualmie Red".)  In 1996 Red Mountain  is on the published Alpine Scramble schedule in May and November.  Scheduled scrambles of Red Mountain for the three previous years were as follows:

Participants on Scramble trips must have graduated from the Alpine Scramble or the Basic Climbing courses or be a current student in one of those two courses.  This trip was rated as an "S-2" or a difficult snow scramble (All scrambles are rated either 1, 2 or 3 translating to "moderate," "difficult" or "most difficult".)  The field trips and lectures during which avalanche awareness and snow travel are covered had occurred during April in both the Scramble and Basic courses meaning that current students were eligible to participate in snow scrambles on the weekend that this trip was scheduled.

Party members
 The members of the party were as follows:

* listed on the 1996 Alpine Scrambling Committee leader list.

Description of route and conditions

 As described by Becky, Red Mountain is a rounded summit of loose reddish rock "with the usual name given to a peak of such surface color," located 3 miles NE of Snoqualmie Pass.  The route as described by Becky is to hike the Commonwealth Creek trail to about 4900 feet, then ascend the prominent spur on Red’s SW slope (above the pond) which bears to the summit at a constant angle of about 40 degrees.  Alternately one can climb the snow gully from the trail on the W slope.  The route description prepared by the Alpine Scramble Committee for Mountaineer trip leaders is as follows:  "Ascend the W slopes keeping W ridge on your right and rock cliffs on your left."  Gene Prater, in his out of print Snow Trails book (Mountaineers, 1975) has this to say:  "Red Mountain (5890), the pyramidal peak at the head of the basin, also has high avalanche hazard but can be a feasible objective.  Continue to the head of Commonwealth Basin instead of swinging left around the base of Guye Peak.  At 4,000 feet the slopes steepen; follow the side draw out of Lundin Chute to the right, to the small flat at 4800 feet which is Red Pond beside the Cascade Crest Trail in the summer.  Any doubt about the stability of slopes above dictates a retreat.  If conditions permit the ascent, ice axes and climbing gear are essential."

According to the staff of the National Avalanche Center the weather conditions on May 19 were not unusually severe.  The Cascades were in the upper trough of a spring storm that weekend which is a common situation for that season.  There was not a great deal of fresh snow at lower elevations but it is estimated that there had been about two inches of snow at the elevation of the avalanche.  It should be emphasized that conditions were changing very rapidly.  The National Avalanche Center had not issued a special avalanche statement for the weekend of May 18 – 19.  Special statements were issued for both the weekend before and the weekend after the accident.

According to Party members the weather on the approach was warm (estimated at 50 degrees) with alternating light rain and sunshine.  The snow was described as firm and well consolidated at lower elevations but wetter and looser above about 5,000 feet.

Description of events

The approach was apparently uneventful to the level of the pond (about 4,800 feet).  At a point about 200 vertical feet above the pond the party stopped and the leader consulted individually with each of the three most experienced party members as to their evaluation of the conditions.  Although the entire party was not polled with regard to the decision to proceed, there was at least an implicit opportunity to express concerns. BD, one of the more experienced members of the party, did express reservations about the condition of the snow.  The leader and the other two experienced members evidently considered the snow sufficiently stable to continue.  The entire group proceeded, evidently relying on an exposed rock band and scattered trees to minimize the risk of slides.  Shortly after resuming the climb at about 11:30 the group observed a small slough.  At least one member of the party recalls noticing a distinct change in the snow conditions with steps "sliding out" when kicked.  At about 11:45, still approximately 800 vertical feet below the summit and just above the rock bank that they had been relying on for protection, the party was hit by a slide which was estimated as being about 100 feet wide and two feet deep.  All eleven members of the party were knocked off their feet by the slide.  Those who were the most seriously injured were apparently those above the exposed rocks at the time they were hit.   The slide carried each of the members of the party three or four hundred feet down the slope but did not bury any of them.  As soon as the snow stopped moving the leader was able to account for all of the party members and by virtue of the fact that all but one of them was sitting or standing he concluded that most of them were not seriously injured.  He directed them toward BD who was obviously the most seriously injured member of the party.  The first concern of the party was to keep BD from sliding out his unstable position.  A platform was shoveled out immediately  below BD while two party members kept him from sliding downhill.  He was then moved onto a space blanket and sit pads on that platform.  During this process a group of seven REI employees was sighted ascending the ridge above and to the right of the Mountaineer party.  They were hailed and descended to assist. Help thus arrived about 15 minutes after the accident occurred. It was quickly decided that two members of the REI group should leave to alert the authorities.  The first aid effort focused almost exclusively on BD and the size of the group created a predictable amount of confusion and disorganization.  Consequently at about 1:15 it was decided to have the seven least seriously injured members of the party walk out with a member of the REI group, leaving DT, CH, and DF with four people from the REI group to care for BD. 

There was considerable concern about their exposure to another avalanche among the three Mountaineer party members who remained.  It was decided, however, that moving BD to a safer place would be a last resort in light of his head and neck injuries.  There were repeated small slides that threatened the party which caused everyone except BD to run, fearing for their own safety.  At about 2:00 a large slide (estimated at several hundred feet across and perhaps five feet deep) passed about fifty feet to the right of the party.  At this point they decided to move.  BD was immobilized to the extent possible under the conditions and was belayed with a rope as he was lowered to approximately the level of the pond where a helicopter landing spot was available.  This took several hours.  Rescue personnel arrived by helicopter at about 5:00 and evacuated DT and BD.  The remaining party members walked out.  Both the party members that started out at 1:15 and those that started out shortly after 5:00 were met by ground based rescue personnel and their injuries were attended to at Snoqualmie Pass.

Analysis

Although Gene Prater and conventional wisdom (at least in some circles) hold that Red Mountain and the other nearby peaks are known to be avalanche prone areas, we were unable to locate records indicating frequent winter accidents on Red Mountain. The winter of 1995-1996 was a bad avalanche season with 28 fatalities nationally and with slides closing both Snoqualmie and Stevens passes locally, but by mid-May the risk of avalanches should have diminished.  Both media reports and "word of mouth" among back-country travelers made it common knowledge that the avalanche season was unusually late in the Cascades during the spring of 1996 and in fact unstable conditions continued to be reported well into June.  In hindsight, the party would have been more protected if they had taken the route on the ridge later selected by the REI group.  However, given the conditions they encountered lower (i.e. firm snow,) the decision to stay with a known route seems reasonable.   The top 800 feet of that route, however, are bare of trees and smooth and steep enough to present an avalanche hazard.  Even two inches of fresh snow on these slopes under the warm conditions present that day should have been cause for concern.

Also in hindsight, the party could have conducted a more formal evaluation of snow conditions and deliberately included all members of the party in the decision to proceed.  While the formality of the process is important in ensuring that inexperienced party members participate and take responsibility for their own decisions, it may be even more critical in a party with several very experienced members where the dynamics of leadership and decision making become more complicated.  It should be noted that it was obvious from the written reports we obtained and from discussions with the party members that none of the party members we talked to felt excluded from the process and that each of them felt comfortable proceeding based on their individual risk assessments.

As a rule, any party could do well to pay closer attention to changing conditions.  This party was no exception.  Similarly, every party has to grapple with the injunction in the climbing code to "never let judgment be overruled by desire when choosing the route or deciding whether to turn back."  Judgment may have been overruled by desire on Red Mountain on May 19. The decision to designate one of the least experienced members of the party as the MOFA leader could also be subject to second-guessing.  It should be acknowledged that it is a common practice to choose the person with the most recent first aid training for that role.  Unfortunately, in an emergency leadership skills are arguably more critical than knowledge of the most current first aid protocols.

Finally, after the accident, there were a number of party members with minor injuries who did not receive thorough body checks or definitive treatment for their lacerations.  In the confusion clearly to be expected among a group of dazed and injured avalanche victims this is not surprising.  The ability that those injured and disoriented climbers displayed to focus their efforts on the individual who was the most seriously injured must be recognized.  Without their attention his survival might have been in question.  Given his head and neck injuries their reluctance to move him was appropriate.  The eventual move away from the continued avalanche danger was appropriately executed and facilitated the eventual success of the rescue.

Recommendations

1. All party members should participate in any decisions which affects the entire group.  The decision to continue or turn back is frequently a difficult one.  It is a balance of conflicting factors and not a simple algorithm.  It is also not just a decision of the leader.  All participants are responsible for safety decisions and should make their opinions known if they are different than those of other party members.   Mountaineer courses should continue to stress that students cannot just "follow the leader."
2. Leaders should have adequate avalanche awareness training.  The club should consider imposing a leadership requirement applicable to all winter activities consisting of minimum avalanche awareness training for the leaders of any back-country activity between November and June.  In the absence of such a club standard individual committees should consider incorporating such a requirement into their leadership standards.
3. Facilitated debriefing secessions should be held about 48 hours after any serious accident.  The debriefing held for this party was very well received.  It would have been more effective if it had been held sooner.